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INFORMATION REPORT

COUNTRY

USSR/Communist China

SUBJECT

Movement of Two Hundred Thousand Soviet

Troops to Frontier 25X1A

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- 1. An important movement of Soviet troops from West to East has taken place during the last few weeks, most of it probably during Nov 1953. The movement has been in reenforcement of Soviet divisions already stationed on the Chinese-Soviet frontier in Manchuria.
- 2. Troop movements are common enough, though not always on such a scale. The queer thing about this troop movement is that it has not been carried out with the utter discretion that usually cloaks any movements of the Red Army. In this case, it is true, Moscow has not been unduly obvious about it and has not exactly shouted its march orders from the housetops. On the other hand, the military authorities have shown a certain complaisance in letting the news leak out and even in allowing it to reach the American intelligence
- 3. It is clear that, in transferring these troops, the Soviet leaders are making a visible gesture of friendship toward the Chinese and North Koreans. They are doing this at the very moment when the future of the two Koreas is under discussion. Moscow wants to prove that the Red Army is all ready to move, in case tension grows worse as a result of a breaking off of negotiations.
- 4. The USSR is careful to utter no imprudent words. They know that the United States would be glad enough to snap them up for propaganda use. Instead, here is action indicating Soviet-Chinese military solidarity, yet carried out with more or less discretion. This may be interpreted as a warning, in case an anti-Communist crusade or a march to the Yalu should be envisaged by the United States, should efforts to reach agreement on Korea fail. It is also a warning against any air offensive against the Yalu bases and the Manchurlan military installations. Pciping and Pyong-Yang are both aware that the axis of Asiatic solidarity passes first through Moscow.

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